Un análisis del contenido protoproposicional de Peacocke

  • Nicolás Alejandro Serrano

Resumen

En su caracterización del contenido no conceptual, Christopher Peacocke realiza un esfuerzo constante por diferenciar el contenido no conceptual protoproposicional que propone del contenido de tipo conceptual. En este trabajo analizaré tales esfuerzos para concluir que resultan infructuosos, llevando al autor a lo que podría denominarse como una rotulación incorrecta del contenido protoproposicional como no conceptual. Para ello, reconstruiré la posición no conceptualista de Peacocke y señalaré, mediante los ejemplos que el mismo autor ofrece, la gran similitud que existe entre ciertos contenidos y procesos paradigmáticamente conceptuales, y los ejemplos de contenidos y procesos que el autor considera como protoproposicionales y presuntamente no conceptuales.

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Publicado
2017-11-01
Cómo citar
SERRANO, Nicolás Alejandro. Un análisis del contenido protoproposicional de Peacocke. Análisis Filosófico, [S.l.], v. 37, n. 2, p. 169 - 194, nov. 2017. ISSN 1851-9636. Disponible en: <http://analisis.sadaf.org.ar/index.php/af/article/view/65>. Fecha de acceso: 16 feb. 2019
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